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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF
EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V SMITH FOR
FAMILY LAW
James G. Dwyer*
Though I have not seen or taken a poll, I would speculate that the
central holding of Employment Division v. Smith'-namely, "that the
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)' ,2 -was much better received among family
law scholars than among First Amendment scholars. If that is so, I
believe the explanation would be that First Amendment scholars are
predominantly concerned about men, whereas family law scholars are
predominantly concerned about women and children. This is a perhaps
too glib a way of stating an observation that First Amendment scholars
mostly worry about the liberty of the autonomous individual vis-d-vis
the state in the public sphere, whereas family law scholars mostly worry
about the vulnerability of dependent persons to abuse by private actors
in the home, and therefore generally support extension of state
protective authority into private life. State involvement in private life is
especially likely to conflict with religion-specifically, with the
freedom of men to subordinate women in the name of religion and the
freedom of parents in the name of religion to do things to their children
that the state believes to be harmful.
So the central holding of Smith is very congenial to the family law
academy. However, two aspects of the Smith opinion, both of which the
Court stated in dictum, threatened to undermine this holding in the
family law realm and, to a large degree, have done so. First, the Court
endorsed legislative accommodation. The Court held that generally,
courts should not create religious exemptions to generally applicable
laws as a matter of individual entitlement. However, that majority
opinion seemed to suggest that if legislatures wish to create such
exemptions they may, without running afoul of the Establishment
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, College of William & Mary.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.
concurring in judgment)).
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Clause.3 This might not be a great concern from a women's-equality
perspective, because women have a sufficient political voice to prevent
passage of laws creating religious exemptions to, for example, partner
violence prohibitions. It is a great concern from a child welfare
perspective, however, because legislatures are deferential in the extreme
to parents who object on religious grounds to state child welfare laws,
with little political pushback. For example, though states heavily
regulate public schools, there is virtually no state regulation or
supervision of what goes on inside religious schools.4 As long as
religious schools comply with fire and safety codes, take attendance,
and profess to be teaching the 3Rs, science, and history, the state leaves
them entirely alone.5 In the realm of medical care, nearly every state
has a religious exemption to its newborn screening law, its vaccination
law, and its medical neglect law. 6 Unless a child is in imminent danger
of severe physical harm or death, the state will not override religiously-
motivated parental choices about medical care. 7 It is not enough that
children experience prolonged suffering.
The second aspect of Smith that made it less than fully welcome to
family law scholars was the apparent reaffirmation of Wisconsin v.
Yoder8 and, more importantly, the concomitant suggestion that the
Smith decision's central principle simply would not apply to religious
parenting cases. In an effort to make the central holding of Smith
appear consistent with precedent, the Smith majority explained away
certain prior free exercise cases in which the Court had held that
religious objectors were entitled to an exemption from a generally
applicable law. The Court did this by asserting that the cases involved a
3 Id at 890 ("[T]o say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required .... ").
4 See JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS ch. 1 (1998).
5 See, e.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1327(b) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. and
1st Special Sess.) (setting forth the singular requirement for religious schools that they send a
letter to the state professing to teach certain subjects, and stating: "It is the policy of the
Commonwealth to preserve the primary right and the obligation of the parent ... to choose the
education and training for such child. Nothing contained in this act shall empower the
Commonwealth, any of its officers, agencies or subdivisions to approve the course content,
faculty, staff or disciplinary requirements of any religious school ... without the consent of said
school."). States generally impose more requirements on homeschools, but there is a broad range
of expectations, from standardized testing and home visits by education officials to merely
requiring that the instructor have a high school diploma. See Paul A. Alarc6n, Recognizing and
Regulating Home Schooling in California: Balancing Parental and State Interests in Education,
13 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 410-11 (2010). And some states excuse homeschooling parents from all
state oversight if they have a religious objection to such oversight. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 22.1-254(B)(1), 22.1-254.1(D) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess. cc. I to 3).
6 See Religious Exemptions From Healthcare for Children, CHILD, INC.,
http://childrenshealthcare.org/?page id=24 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
7 See generally James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect
Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 147 (2000).
8 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
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second constitutional claim in addition to a free exercise claim. 9 The
Court identified only two types of cases fitting this description: those
involving other First Amendment freedoms-speech or press-and
those involving parents' rights with respect to child rearing.
Representing the latter category of "hybrid rights cases" was Yoder, in
which the Court held that Amish parents are entitled to an exemption
from compulsory education laws.
What precisely the majority in Smith was thinking about religious
parenting cases is quite unclear. What the majority opinion says about
Yoder is just that it presented a "hybrid situation" and the state lost.10
One might infer that the Court was reaffirming the outcome in Yoder,
but the Court did not say that. Consistent with what it did say, the Smith
majority opinion could have gone on to state that the Court had, on rare
occasions, made mistakes, and that Yoder was one of those occasions.
One might also infer that the Court in Smith was thinking that its
holding would not apply to any parenting cases, and that strict scrutiny
would apply in all parenting cases, but the Court also did not say either
of those things. The Court might instead have been thinking that the
Yoder approach would continue to apply solely in education cases and
not in other parenting contexts. Support for that more limited reading
comes from the Court's explanation of Yoder as involving "the right of
parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the
education of their children,"1 I and from a list the Court offers later in its
opinion of child welfare laws as to which parents are generally not
constitutionally entitled to a religious exemption. The Court stated:
"The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally
required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind . . . ."12 The Court included in the list of such civic
obligations child neglect laws, compulsory vaccination laws, and child
labor laws.13 Then the Court finished its thought by stating: "The First
Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this."l 4 In
fact, some lower courts, before and after Smith, have read the Yoder
holding as severely limited in scope, not simply confined to conflicts
over education but actually confined to just the Amish and groups very
much like the Amish.15 On the other hand, the Smith majority also
9 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
10 Id. ("The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional
protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of parents ... to direct the
education of their children . . . ." (citations omitted)).
11 Id. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
12 Id at 888-89.
'3 Id
14 Id. at 889.
15 See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 250-52 (3d Cir. 2008).
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pointed out that Mr. Smith did not allege "any communicative activity
or parental right,"l 6 suggesting that any parenting activity might be
covered by the exception.
In sum, the Court sent mixed signals about parenting cases,
probably reflecting very muddled thinking, or a lack of thought, with
respect to such cases, leaving family law professors, lower courts,
legislatures, school districts, and parents in great confusion about what
the constitutional rule is for parental religious objections to state-
imposed school regulations.
In addition to this lack of clarity, the Court's implicit explanation
of Yoder is nonsensical. The majority suggested that the Yoder Court
viewed the substantive due process claim of the parents as sufficient on
its own to block prosecution of the Amish parents for violating the
school attendance laws. After asserting that the Court had previously
invalidated laws in free exercise cases only when a second
constitutional right was infringed, the majority stated:
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or
parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when
otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious
convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be
free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and
decline to do so now.
The majority here suggested that parents withholding children from
schooling is not "otherwise prohibitable," because of parents'
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right. But the Yoder
Court dismissed out of hand the notion that parents' substantive due
process rights, as established in the Court's prior decisions, Pierce'8 and
Meyer v. Nebraska,19 could do any work in that case:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it
is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of
the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief... . Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however,
we see that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that
the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction .... 20
And later: "It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing
with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have
recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for
16 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
I7 See id.
18 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
19 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
20 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (emphasis added).
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rearing children for modem life." 21 Rather, the Yoder Court treated the
Free Exercise claim as alone giving parents a leg to stand on. When it
announced that strict scrutiny would apply, it spoke simply and broadly
of religious freedom: "The essence of all that has been said and written
on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion." 22  And the Yoder Court cited in support of
applying heightened scrutiny to non-parenting cases such as Sherbert v.
Verner23 and Walz v. Tax Commission, even to laws that are generally
applicable and neutral as to religion.24
Parenting cases prior to Yoder also reflect the view that a free
exercise claim enhances a substantive due process objection to state
regulation of child rearing, raising the level of judicial scrutiny. Pierce
and Meyer were prior to the Court's development of the levels-of-
scrutiny concept, but their holdings rested on an assumption that the
state had shown no rational relation between the laws at issue and any
legitimate state interest, and so failed what the Court would later term a
rational basis test.25 Then, in the Court's other religious parenting case,
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court emphasized that more than "mere"
general right of parents with respect to child rearing was at issue; the
free exercise element raised the bar for the state.2 6 The Court said in
Prince: "Against these sacred private interests [in adhering to religious
convictions], basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to
protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to
that end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things
were involved." 27
So the Smith majority misread Yoder rather than either conceding
that it contradicts their account of the doctrine and the principle that
Smith enshrines or saying that Yoder is simply no longer good law
(which would surely have caused the Amish great consternation).
Suggesting that due process was doing all or even most of the work in
Yoder is completely implausible.
A somewhat more plausible, but still inaccurate, way to interpret
Yoder to make it support the hybrid rights idea would be to view it as
resting on an assumption that neither substantive due process nor free
exercise alone triggers heightened scrutiny, but the combination of the
two does so. In other words, both parents' rights and free exercise
21 Id. at 235.
22 Id. at 215.
23 Id. at 215, 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
24 Id. at 220 (citing Walz v. Tax Comrn'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
25 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399-400, 403 (1923).
26 See supra notes 20-24.
27 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
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rights might be "weak rights," as against laws of general applicability,
but when combined collectively constitute a "strong right."
Commentators considering this understanding of Smith's hybrid rights
language were predominantly derisive of this idea for two primary
reasons: (1) it is quite difficult to make sense of and justify an additive
notion of rights; and (2) it is about as clear an instance as one could
imagine of an exception swallowing a rule.28
The additive view of rights is difficult to justify conceptually
because it appears to presuppose a quantification of a right's strength.
One would need, in at least a rough sort of way, to assign some value to
each single right, establish some threshold value for a right's triggering
heightened review, and assume that the value of each single right is
below this threshold, but then find that adding the values of two such
rights together creates a sum that is above the threshold. It is difficult to
know even where to begin with such quantification and calculation.
The hybrid rights idea would create an exception that swallows the
rule because in almost every free exercise case, it is an easy matter to
assert not only the Free Exercise Clause, but also the Free Speech
Clause and/or the Due Process Clause. Any speech is presumptively
protected by the Free Speech Clause, any conduct is presumptively
protected to some degree by substantive due process doctrine, and any
religious exercise must involve speech or conduct or both.29 The point
here is not that all speech is absolutely protected under the Free Speech
Clause, nor that any conduct that is part of religious exercise would
always be independently fully safeguarded under the Fourteenth
Amendment: neither of those things is true. The point is rather that a
person who has engaged in religious exercise can almost always state a
prima facie case under either the Free Speech Clause or the Due Process
Clause. The only exception might be speech the Court has determined
to be categorically excluded from Free Speech Clause protection, such
as obscenity, and speech in those categories is rarely, if ever, religiously
motivated.
In any event, the Smith Court effectively invited parents who want
an exemption from any child welfare legislation to assert a "hybrid
28 For a summary of the commentary, see Ariana S. Cooper, Free Exercise Claims in Custody
Battles: Is Heightened Scrutiny Required Post-Smith?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 716, 721 (2008).
Some of the Court's members have also leveled such criticism. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
29 The Smith Court did suggest at one point that only "communicative activity or parental
right" can give rise to a colorable free exercise demand for exemption from a generally applicable
law, emphasizing that the private individual seeking strict scrutiny in Smith had not alleged either
of those things. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) ("The present case does not
present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative
activity or parental right."). But the Court offers no basis for the peculiar proposition that
parents' rights precedents are the only strain of substantive due process doctrine that religious
objectors can invoke to bolster their claim.
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rights claim." It sent very mixed signals, but some of the signals
suggested that nothing was to change in the realm of child rearing in
terms of constitutional litigation. Lawyers for parents now just had to
make sure they mentioned due process and/or free speech, as well as
free exercise. And so, almost without fail in the two decades since
Smith, parents' attorneys in litigated parent-state conflicts over child
rearing have advanced a hybrid rights claim. Arguably it would be
malpractice not to do so. Undoubtedly, in the past twenty years, there
has been much more litigation, much more disruption of families' lives,
and much more expense to school districts and other state agencies than
there would have been if the Smith Court had stated simply that the
central principle of its holding would henceforth apply in all contexts,
including parental objections to school regulation and other child
welfare laws.
Because of the vagueness and illogic of Smith's hybrid rights idea,
lower courts have reached divergent conclusions about the viability of a
hybrid rights claim. 30 Very few courts have accepted the claim and then
handed victory to parents after applying strict scrutiny. When that has
happened, the state interest at stake was fairly weak-for example, in
student dress code cases.3' Parents have almost always lost when
objecting to a medical care legal requirement on religious grounds.32
Many more courts have either accepted the argument that alleging
substantive due process as well as free exercise raises the level of
scrutiny, or have assumed for the sake of analysis that the argument was
persuasive, but have then found either that the parent failed to establish
a proper hybrid rights claim or that the state action satisfied strict
scrutiny. 33 And a substantial number of courts have rejected the hybrid
rights argument and applied rational basis review. Those who have
rejected the argument, or who have analyzed the parents' claims in the
alternative under both levels of scrutiny, have offered various
explanations for their reluctance to conclude that strict scrutiny is
required. Some have pointed to the objections above-that is, that the
30 For a series of articles discussing lower court treatment of hybrid rights claims in a variety
of contexts, see Cooper, supra note 28, at 723 n.55.
31 See, e.g., Hicks v. Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653-54 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
(involving challenge to mandatory uniform policy at an elementary school that was not a response
to any particular problem with student dress); Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 701
F. Supp. 2d 863, 881 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding hair style regulations at an elementary school
unnecessary to meet the school's stated goals of maintaining order, discipline, and hygiene).
32 See, e.g., Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 605-08 (Neb. 2005) (rejecting parental
religious objection to a newborn-metabolic-screening mandate).
33 Some courts that find no proper hybrid rights claim presented do so because the other claim
was not "independently viable" and some because the other claim was not "colorable." See, e.g.,
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that plaintiff must
show at least a colorable claim under parents' rights doctrine); Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding parental substantive due process claim not
independently viable).
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very idea of additive rights is incoherent or that such an exception
would swallow the rule. 34 Others have relied on the fact that the idea of
additive rights comes from mere dictum in Smith, while also reading
Smith to create a new rule for free exercise cases generally. 35 Or they
have pointed to the dictum in Smith that is specifically about
vaccination and medical neglect. Some have implored the Supreme
Court to clear things up. Others ignore the issue and just cite precedent
on the specific issue before them.36
Now I will explain why the parenting context is less-rather than
more-appropriate for religious exemptions, contrary to the tenor of
Smith's handling of Yoder. First, the right-holder claim in parenting
cases is, properly viewed, quite weak, and arguably incoherent and
illicit. It is at least weak, because the right holder-the parent-is not
complaining about the state interfering with his or her self-
determination the way Mr. Smith was and the way most people are
when alleging a violation of their rights. Rather, the supposed right
holder is complaining about the state interfering with his or her control
of another person's life. Simply as a conceptual matter, a demand for
control of another person's life must be weaker than a demand for
control of one's own life, regardless of the relationship one has with the
other person. In fact, in any context other than parenting, including
other contexts involving care of non-autonomous persons who are close
family members, we would be quite perplexed by someone insisting that
they have a constitutional right to control some aspect of another
person's life, such as their medical care or education.37 Even the most
extreme pro-lifers, for example, do not claim that they themselves have
a constitutional right to control pregnant women.
Second, although any religious exemptions create an equality
problem, they are likely to create a clearer and more troubling equality
problem in the child-rearing context. If Mr. Smith was given an
exemption, others who want to consume peyote or some other illegal
substance might understandably complain about this unequal treatment
as a favoring of religion over non-religion. However, there would be a
somewhat plausible defense of the inequality, on the grounds that Mr.
Smith arguably has a stronger interest at stake than recreational users
34 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
35 See, e.g., Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2008); Leebaert
v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir. 2001).
36 See, e.g., Workman v. Mingo Cnty. Schs., 667 F. Supp. 2d 679, 688-89 (S.D. W. Va.
2009).
37 Cf Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266-67, 285-87 (1990) (rejecting a
suggestion by parents of an adult in a persistent vegetative state that they had a constitutional
right to make the decision to terminate their daughter's life support, and stating that, regardless of
how strongly the parents felt about the matter, only the incompetent adult herself had any
constitutional rights in the matter that could properly be considered).
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do; correspondingly, the person denied permission to take a drug will
not suffer as much. This would be true in many other cases as well-
for example, if someone in the military just likes wearing baseball caps,
rather than being under a religious command to wear a particular form
of head dress, or if some people will simply have their view spoiled by
construction of a highway rather than having their sacred land violated.
In contrast, in the case of parenting, exemptions do create a danger of
real harm not to those denied an exemption, but to the children of those
who receive the exemption. Exemptions from school regulations and
from medical care requirements create danger of significant harm to the
cognitive development and health of the free exercise claimants'
children. They incur a danger from which other children receive legal
protection. And there is generally no plausible defense of the
discriminatory treatment that can be given to the children, the people
who are truly harmed by it.38 Imagine that you are a state legislator
speaking to a one-year-old child who is dying because of a genetic
condition that could have been corrected at birth, but now cannot be
treated, and that it was not detected because the parents claimed a
religious exemption from the state's metabolic screening law. How
would that speech go? "Well, we had to let your parents refuse the
screening, even though your interest in receiving it was just as great as
that of any other child, because .. " Or imagine speaking to an
eighteen-year-old who wishes she could become a doctor, but who has
never had any real science or math instruction because her parents'
religious community operated its own school and did not believe girls
should be prepared for college. How would you justify having
supported laws that exempted religious schools from all meaningful
academic requirements? "Really, it was for your own good,
because . . . ." Or "well, you did not have as much of an interest in
receiving a secular education as other children had, because . . . ."
In sum, then, although the central principle of Smith is one very
congenial to those of us worried about free exercise of religion being
asserted as a barrier to state efforts to protect vulnerable persons in
private life, the family law baggage Smith carried with it has created a
mess. The Court might never be forced to clear up the mess, because
legislatures are so accommodating of religiously-motivated parents that
few such parents have reason to initiate litigation, and because there is
no constituency for challenging the accommodations as violations of
children's equal protection right. Such accommodation is sometimes
challenged by parents who want to avoid a state welfare law, but whose
38 For an extended presentation of this equal protection analysis, see DWYER, supra note 4,
and James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and
Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1321, 1414-20 (1996).
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objection to the law is secular. They assert their own equal protection
right and the Establishment Clause as bases for objecting to
accommodation of only religious objectors, and they usually lose. 39 An
irony of the free exercise parenting doctrine is that parents are in a
worse position if they agree with the state on the ends for children, but
have empirical evidence contradicting the means the state has chosen
than they would be if they simply rejected the state's aims for children
and asserted that their religion tells them to do so. For example, if you
do not want your child to receive the polio vaccine because you know
polio is virtually non-existent in the United States and you have read
that the vaccine can have harmful side effects, the state need not pay
you any heed, but if you object that vaccines are the work of the devil, a
court might order your child's school district to waive the vaccination
requirement to accommodate your belief. Those of us who find this
troubling from the perspective of children's welfare and rights (and
perhaps also from the perspective of religious neutrality) can only hope
that someday soon a medical care or private school regulation case will
make its way to the Supreme Court and the Court will inject some
clarity, logic, and respect for children into the doctrine governing
religious parenting cases.
39 See, e.g., People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 117 (Mich. 1993); People v. DeJonge, 501
N.W.2d 127, 129, 131 (Mich. 1993). Bennett and DeJonge were companion cases in which the
Supreme Court of Michigan held that a state law requiring homeschool instructors to be state
certified teachers violated the free exercise right of parents who objected to the requirement on
religious grounds and did not wish to comply with any state requirements for schooling.
However, the Court held the law did not violate the due process right of parents who objected to
the certification requirement for non-religious reasons, such as the fact that they could show in
other ways their competence to provide a good secular education to their children.
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